We bound features of counterfactual choices in the nonparametric random utility model of demand (Kitamura and Stoye 2018), i.e. if observable choices are repeated cross-sections and one allows for unrestricted, unobserved heterogeneity. In this setting, tight bounds are developed on counterfactual discrete choice probabilities and on the expectation and c.d.f. of (functionals of) counterfactual stochastic demand.
Introduction
Consider the random utility model of demand analyzed in McFadden and Richter (1991) , McFadden (2005) , and Kitamura and Stoye (2018) : Repeated cross-sections of demand are observed on a finite sequence of budgets; the maintained assumption is that these cross-sections are of a population of individually rational (in the sense of maximizing utility) individuals; however, one does not substantively restrict utility functions nor their distribution, that is, one allows for unrestricted and possibly infinite dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. McFadden (2005) characterizes the empirical content of this model in population. We build on his results to provide tight bounds on the distribution of counterfactual demand, i.e. of stochastic demand on as yet unobserved budgets, as well as explicit bounds on the expectation and c.d.f. of linear functions of demand vectors, e.g. demand for a specific good. Many of these bounds turn out to be the values of linear programs, hence are easy to compute even in moderately high dimensional applications. 1 We next describe the setup and recall an important characterization of stochastic rationalizability, then provide the bounds, and close by mentioning some extensions.
Stochastic Rationalizability
We use notation from Kitamura and Stoye (2018) . There are J observed budgets {B j } J j=1 , J ∈ N, each characterized by price vectors p j ∈ R K + , where expenditure is normalized to 1:
Suppose that we know a stochastic demand system
where the random variable y(p j ) is demand on budget B j . This collection of distributions is rationalizable by a random utility model if there exists a distribution P u over locally nonsatiated (for simplicity) utility functions u :
Our motivation is demand estimation from repeated cross-section with unobserved heterogeneity, but the model has also been used to describe choices made by an individual with random utility.
We next recall a succinct description of its empirical content.
Let X ≡ {x 1 , ..., x I } be the coarsest partition of ∪ J j=1 B j such that for any i ∈ {1, ..., I} and j ∈ {1, ..., J}, x i is either completely on, completely strictly above, or completely strictly below budget plane B j . Equivalently, any y 1 , y 2 ∈ ∪ J j=1 B j are in the same element of the partition iff sg(p j y 1 − 1) = sg(p j y 2 − 1) for all j = 1, ..., J. Elements of X will be called patches. Each budget can be uniquely expressed as union of patches; the number of patches that jointly comprise budget B j will be called I j . For future reference, we emphasize that any patch is the intersection of finitely many open or closed half spaces and therefore its closure (though not necessarily the patch itself) is a finite polytope. π ≡ (π 1|1 , . . . , π I 1 |1 , π 1|2 , . . . , π I J |J ), where π i|j ≡ P j (x i|j ). Next, note that any rationalizable nonstochastic demand system can be thought of as a degenerate stochastic demand system with binary vector representation. A stochastic demand system is rationalizable iff it is a mixture of such rationalizable nonstochastic demand systems because the latter can be thought of as representing choice types in the population. But due to the discretization of the choice universe into patches, there are only finitely many such types. Collect their vector representations in the H < ∞ columns of the rational demand matrix A: see Kitamura and Stoye (2018) (in particular Definition 3.5 and discussions in Sections 3.2 -3.4). Then we have: 3 Theorem 1. The stochastic demand system (P 1 , . . . , P J ) is rationalizable if, and only if, its vector representation π fulfills π = Aν for some ν ∈ ∆ H−1 . Here, ∆ H−1 is the unit simplex in R H .
Bounds on Counterfactuals
We next take a rationalizable stochastic demand system (P 1 , . . . , P J ) as given and ask what discipline it places on
the stochastic demand at some counterfactual budget B 0 corresponding to counterfactual price p 0 . 4
As with nonstochastic demand, this discipline will typically take the form of bounds, although these are now on a distribution. They are tightly related to testing rationalizability because a distribution P 0 of demands on B 0 is inside the bounds iff (P 0 , ..., P J ) are jointly rationalizable; thus, Theorem 1 implies an exact characterization of bounds on P 0 implied by knowledge of (P 1 , ..., P J ). We will now formally state this characterization.
Recall that the matrix A in Theorem 1 is obtained for the set of observed budgets (B 1 , ..., B J ).
We can apply the same algorithm to the augmented set of budgets (B 0 , B 1 , ..., B J ) to obtain patches on it and its vector representations: for completeness we write them
3 The statement follows Kitamura and Stoye (2018) , who also prove it, provide algorithms for computing A, and point out that ν ∈ ∆ H−1 can be conveniently weakened to ν ≥ 0. However, the discretization step is clearly anticipated in
McFadden (2005), and the result was otherwise proved in McFadden and Richter (1991) . See also Stoye (2019) . 4 For the very special case of K = 2, Hoderlein and Stoye (2015) provide closed-form bounds. Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008) and many others provide bounds under slightly stronger, e.g. aggregation, assumptions.
The patches for the original system (B 1 , ..., B J ) remain unchanged in the augmented system if they
for such j . Moreover we can apply the algorithm discussed in Section 2 to the augmented system
Note that each row of A * corresponds to a patch in the new vector representation (3.1). Once A * is obtained, we can define a probability vector ν * ∈ ∆ H * −1 , now defined over the columns of A * , and the choice probability vector π * for the patches {x * 1|0 , ..., x *
Note that the elements of π * corresponding to ∪ J j=1 B j are observed, while the rest remain unobserved: the latter are counterfactual conditional probabilities. To make this point clear, we write
where A * 0 collects rows of A * that correspond to patches that do not belong to ∪ J j=1 B j , A * 1 collects all other patches, and similarly for π * . It continues to be the case that π * is rationalizable iff A * ν * = π * for some ν * ∈ ∆ H * −1 . However, rather than taking π * to be observed and testing rationalizability, we take π * 1 to be observed and π * 0 to a vector of counterfactual probabilities to be accordingly constrained by the observed π * 1 . Formally:
Theorem 2. A distribution P 0 is consistent with observed demands (P 1 , ..., P J ) if, and only if, its implied value of π * 0 fulfils
Here, π * 1 takes the value implied by (P 1 , . . . , P J ). In particular, the conditional distributions P 0 (·|y ∈ x * i|0 ) (for all for all i = 1, . . . , I * 0 where this is defined) are not restricted.
We next explain how this result translates into extremely tractable, best possible bounds on many parameters of interest. Specifically, we have:
Corollary 1. For any known function g :
are sharp, i.e. they cannot be improved upon without further information.
Proof. By the Law of Iterated Expectations,
= 0 and otherwise we assign it an arbitrary value. By inspection of (3.2), (3.3), and (3.5), the upper and lower bounds are valid and can be approached arbitrarily closely. Furthermore, if distributions P 0 and Q 0 are consistent with observable demands (P 1 , . . . , P J ), then so is any mixture between them. Hence, all values strictly between the bounds are attained by appropriate mixtures of distributions that approximate the bounds.
The proof reveals not only that the bounds are sharp, but also that all intermediate values Computing these bounds requires to solve the linear programs in (3.4) and, as an input, the optimization problems in (3.2)-(3.3). The latter are tractable in relevant cases: If g is continuous, the constraint sets can be taken to be the closures of patches, hence finite polytopes. If g is furthermore linear, then computing the bounds requires only linear programming, though possibly with many constraints.
We further elaborate this result by more explicitly bounding the expected value and c.d.f. of z y(p 0 ), where z ∈ R K is a user-specified vector. For example, z = (1, 0, . . . , 0) extracts demand for good 1 and z = (p 0 , 0, . . . , 0) (i.e., the first two components of p 0 followed by zeroes) extracts joint expenditure on the first two goods. Corollary 1 then specializes as follows.
KITAMURA AND STOYE
Then the bounds
We note that computation of these bounds only requires linear programming. Next, we bound probabilities of arbitrary events and hence also c.d.f.'s.
Corollary 3. For fixed event x ⊆ B 0 , the bounds min i∈{1,...,I * 0 }:
Here, e i is the i'th canonical basis vector in R I * 0 .
For fixed vector z ∈ R K , let
Then the following bounds on the c.d.f. of z y(p 0 ) are sharp:
The bounds on the c.d.f. require essentially only linear programming, with a minimal additional check in the finitely many cases where m i|0 (z) = t. 5 They are pointwise but not uniform in t;
in particular, their upper and lower envelopes do not necessarily describe feasible counterfactual distributions. 6 Therefore, while the upper and lower envelopes induce bounds on a multitude of more complicated parameters (Stoye 2010) , those bounds are not in general tight.
Concluding Remarks
We conclude by mentioning some connections and extensions.
First, we considered the case of one counterfactual budget for expositional clarity. Bounds on the joint c.d.f. of demand on two counterfactual budgets, or on some linear combination of expected values, are straightforward extensions of the above results. In general, they can be considerably tighter than the Cartesian product of budget-by-budget bounds and also need not include the budget-bybudget minimum and maximum bound. For the case of a single (possibly fictitious, e.g. representative)
nonstochastic utility maximizer, see Adams (2018) for a much more extensive analysis in this spirit.
Next, these results naturally extend to finite discrete choice settings, i.e. if choices from distinct subsets C 1 , . . . , C J of a finite choice universe X (the duplication of notation is intended) were observed and choices from another such subset C 0 are to be predicted. In this case, the finitely many elements of X directly play the role of patches, the conditional distributions on patches are trivial, and Theorem 2 completely characterizes those p.m.f.'s of counterfactual random choice that are consistent with observed choice distributions. The corollaries apply to the extent that relevant quantities are defined, which depends on the application; e.g., X need not be contained in a vector space. See Manski (2007) for a previous analysis of this setting in economics. Our analysis clarifies that such extrapolation problems are linear programming problems.
Finally, we developed population-level bounds but ignored estimation and inference. To handle this, note that if one takes (p 0 , . . . , p J ) and therefore A * to be known, then all the above bounds maximize or minimize γA * 0 ν * for some known vector γ; it is only π * 1 that must be estimated. This is essentially the estimation and inference problem analyzed in Section 4.2 of Deb, Kitamura, Quah, and Stoye (2018) .
